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There is currently an expansion of local energy initiatives, underpinned by the desire to reduce energy-
related carbon emissions and in recognition of the importance of the local arena to achieving such
change. Much of the research on these initiatives has been framed by a conventional economic approach,
identifying barriers, drivers and incentives to explain their emergence (or not). Here a new economic
sociological approach is taken which sees markets as socio-materially constructed and points to the
importance of tracing exchange flows and determining modalities of valuation for such exchanges. Arte-
facts or market devices are seen to play a particular role in connecting actors and technologies within
coordinating institutional arrangements and offer the potential for making innovative projects conven-
tional. These aspects are explored in four international case-studies from Wales, Sweden, Germany and
USA, mapping relations, identifying exchange flows, pinpointing how artefacts coordinate and showing
the multiple modalities of valuation involved in each case. Conclusions concerning the importance of
negotiation against a market backdrop and rendering exchange flows more certain are drawn.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an openaccess article under the CCBY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).Introduction
The government should provide more financial support to busi-
nesses, local authorities and schools to help them install renew-
able energy such as solar arrays and wind turbines, a
parliamentary committee said on Tuesday (Reuters, August 6,
2013).1
In approaching the challenge of sustainable energy manage-
ment where the built environment is concerned, a consensus has
been building around the need for a hybrid system that involves
at least some degree of decentralised energy (GOS, 2008). In
response we are seeing a proliferation of diverse local energy pro-
jects that are seeking to embed themselves within the energy
economy, creating multiple pathways in a period of some consid-
erable dynamism (Rydin et al., 2013). These new initiatives needto jump a number of hurdles if they are to succeed individually
and further be replicated so as to establish new options for the
energy system. Clearly each project needs to work in technological
terms and be socially accepted in terms of both being considered
legitimate and supporting social practices that operationalise the
technology in desired directions. But the projects also need to be
viable. This can all too readily be seen as simply a matter of income
exceeding expenditure but Callon has alerted us to the bigger pro-
gramme involved here, one of economiziation, of rendering the
projects ‘economic’ in terms of being part of an economy and hence
of a society dependent on economic processes. This paper looks at
a selection of local energy initiatives from this perspective, asking:
what are the dynamics by which these projects are rendered eco-
nomic? The answer to this question holds the key to turning an
innovative project into a conventional one and making it part of
established modes of energy production, distribution and
consumption.
The first part of the paper outlines the relevant work of Callon
and his collaborators in establishing a research programme for
understanding economization. After a brief methodology section,
the remainder of the paper analyses four local energy projects from
this theoretical perspective. A conclusion draws together the main
insights and implications of this research.
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As our opening quote suggests, there is widespread recognition
of the role of finance in new decentralised energy projects. Rydin
et al. (op. cit.) identified the number of potential pathways of urban
energy change that involve a reliance on grants and subsidies while
Sherriff (2013) has reported on a Delphi study suggesting the
prominence of economic concerns and the identification of access
to funding as a key barrier to innovation, alongside economic
short-termism and doubts about energy prices rising sufficiently
to incentivise investment. There is a wide range of references
where finance generally is presented as either a barrier to or driver
for the success of individual energy projects and energy innovation
more broadly (for example, Dyer et al., 2008; Kann, 2009; Mezher
et al., 2012; Peterman et al., 2012; Rohdin et al., 2007; Rösch and
Kaltschmitt, 1999; Walker, 2008).
Interesting as these conclusions are, they derive from a narrow
conceptualisation of how finance operates in relation to local
energy projects, one that is based (sometimes implicitly) in the
neo-classical framework of financial incentives driving supply
and demand and hence change. There are two limitations to this.
First, it ignores the active role of neo-classical economic thinking
in actively constructing the economy that it claims objectively to
study. Callon (1998) argues that neo-classical economics has pre-
sented an academic construction of what a market is, which has
performatively helped to create markets. Similarly Mackenzie,
Muniesa and Siu emphasise that such economics is not ‘‘a form
of knowledge that depicts an already existing state of affairs but
a set of instruments and practices that contribute to the construc-
tion of economic settings, actors and institutions’’ (2007, p. 4). Sec-
ond, as a result, this approach renders the economy and the
economic as a separate sphere; it creates a conceptual divide
between social and economic processes. As Pryke and du Gay note:
‘‘the economic is always identifiable and locatable, as it were, far
from the social or the cultural’’ (2002, p. 267). So ‘finance’ is often
viewed as playing a distinct, limited and instrumental role as
either a project constraint or enabler.
The new economic sociology (also termed the cultural economy
approach) seeks to present an alternative perspective, one in which
the construction of the ‘economic’, of ‘markets’ and the ‘economy’
is problematised. Inspired by the work of Callon’s study of ‘The
Laws of Markets’ (1998), scholars such as Du Gay and Pryke
(2002), Thrift (2002) and Miller and Rose (2008) have been devel-
oping an relational perspective on the making of ‘markets’ and the
‘doing ‘ of economics as social and cultural practices. Du Gay and
Pryke argue that an understanding of economics as culture high-
lights how the ‘making-up’ or ‘construction’ of economic realities
is ‘‘undertaken and achieved’’ (2002, p. 5). But Callon and
Caliskan (2009) emphasise that this goes beyond a social construc-
tivist perspective. Following the insights of Actor-Network Theory,
it involves, the myriad ways or ‘practices’ through which markets
are reshaped by ‘‘performing calculations, monetary inter-changes,
transactions and relations of all kinds’’, including recognition of the
role of the material in creating and sustaining market processes
(Law, 2002, p. 25). For Law, understanding ‘economics’ or ‘markets’
becomes an ‘‘investigation of the ordering of materially heteroge-
neous socio-technical economically relevant relations, their enact-
ment and performance’’ (ibid).
From this perspective, the ‘economic’ does not therefore stand
apart from local energy projects as a vital or missing ingredient,
but rather flows through the design, development, implementa-
tion, operation and maintenance of such infrastructures, showing
up in various forms as subsidies, models, leases, bonds, contracts,
investments, risk calculations etc. In doing so it performs a variety
of roles; providing investment benchmarks, linking private and
public interests, directing expertise, enabling ownership patterns,bridging interests, ensuring stability, extending relationships over
space and time, reducing risk, raising value and so on.
Here it can be helpful to follow the lead of Lovell and Smith and
distinguish between market arrangements as a whole set within
the wider economy – which Lovell and Smith (2010) following Cal-
lon use the term agencement to describe – and the specific mixes of
technology, social and economic dynamics in projects operating
within existing markets – which they discuss in terms of assem-
blages. They see markets as ‘‘complex entanglements or networks
of humans, materials, institutions, politics and technologies’’ (p.
458) but note a difference between the inter-related processes at
macro and micro scales. This is helpful because at the scale of
the particular local project, specific actors, aspects of technology
and artefacts can be identified and relationships across actants –
material and social – traced in detail (see also Murray Li, 2007;
Farias and Bender, 2009; Guy et al., 2011).
However, the distinction should not be over-drawn. A focus on
projects should not be at the expense of the consideration of mar-
kets; rather these remain always interconnected, as will be seen.
The concepts that help bridge the project and market scales can
be found in Callon and Caliskan’s economization agenda (2009,
2010) and its identification of the importance of tracing flows of
exchanges within institutional arrangements and identifying
modalities of valuation. For Callon and Caliskan ‘‘the establishment
of an economy involves institutional arrangements and material
assemblages, without which nothing economic could exist or be
sustained’’ (2009, p. 371). Institutions are here seen as ‘‘devices
for coordination’’ (2009, p. 379), which make up for the deficien-
cies of currently bounded calculative capacities and strategic com-
petences (2009, p. 380). Interestingly they are also testimony to
‘‘the inventiveness of human beings, capable of reflection and
innovation’’ (2009, p. 379). New institutional arrangements can
afford new capacities and competencies the possibility of being
enacted. This opens up the prospects for innovation and change
to occur as new conventions emerge and are stabilised. This
approach has much to offer the study of newmodels of energy pro-
duction and distribution, drawing attention to the role of econom-
ization in stabilising these new modes of coordination.
The key turns out to be the way that exchanges of goods or ser-
vices for money and the associated calculative processes of valua-
tion create new institutional arrangements and the potential for
new modes of socio-material relationships to become stabilised.
For local energy projects involve a variety of exchanges, not just
the ‘sale’ of energy but a sequence of inter-connected exchanges
of financial and material elements. What we focus on here is the
way that particular institutional arrangements associated with
innovative energy projects allow exchanges to occur (principally
of energy/electricity/heat with money but also involving landed
property of sites, buildings and rooftops). Furthermore we look at
the modalities of valuation that are required to enable the
exchanges to proceed – to turn monetary capital and material ele-
ments into equivalences that can be exchanged. The importance of
calculative processes such as valuation is a key theme of Callon and
Caliskan’s take on the new economic sociology: ‘‘the decisive role
played by techniques, sciences, standards, calculating instruments,
metrology and, more generally, material infrastructure in market
formation’’ (2009, p. 384; see also Guy, 2002; Lapsley et al.,
2010). The flows of finance, energy in all its forms and other mate-
rial elements within local energy projects is only possible through
institutionally-sanctioned valuation processes. Circulation, valua-
tion and institutional arrangements all co-constitute each other
and are necessary for the local energy initiative to function. What
the focus on institutions, valuation and circulation offers is the
possibility of understanding how the urban energy project may
be stabilised and then capable of replication in other contexts.
The important point that Callon and Caliskan make is that ‘‘the
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tems, but they emerge from sequences of transformations, initi-
ated by people, that modify their status’’ (2009, p. 386). We seek
to trace these sequences and flows in the case of four local energy
projects.
In the following analysis we focus on the interactions between
the heterogeneous elements of these projects and pay particular
attention to the ‘economic’ in terms of financial flows within the
projects and to the work of valuation processes often captured in
material artefacts or market devices. Specifically, we want to con-
sider how such artefacts exercise agency within network relation-
ships and also how they are co-involved in shaping the
relationships of ‘human’ actors with the ‘non-human’ actants of
the energy system and building technologies. These market devices
can be defined as ‘‘a simple way of referring to the material and
discursive assemblages that intervene in the construction of mar-
kets’’ (Muniesa et al., 2007, p. 2; see also Callon, 1998; Callon
et al., 2007) but there is a particular emphasis on the calculative
nature of such devices (ibid, p. 4):
‘‘Market socio-technical agencements are cluttered with a vari-
ety of abstractive calculative devices: pricing techniques,
accounting methods, monitoring instruments, trading protocols
and benchmarking procedures are abstractors then enter into
the construction of economic agencement.’’
As we shall see, it is important to trace the nature of such cal-
culation within specific projects – and not just the frame of the
market device – to understand the way coordination is stabilised.
Methodology
The research which underpins the paper was undertaken within
the EPSRC funded CLUES project, which looked more broadly at the
role of local energy initiatives in reshaping urban energy systems
and urban areas.2 As part of this project, a series of 13 case studies
– both in the UK and abroad – were undertaken (Chmutina et al.,
2012; Devine-Wright and Wiersma, 2012, 2013; Goodier and
Chmutina, 2013). This paper takes four diverse cases from the CLUES
project each of which demonstrated economic viability in particu-
larly interesting ways. The four case studies discussed involve two
private sector-driven examples of new development: a commercial
office development in central Stockholm, Sweden and small-scale
wind turbine infrastructure in Newport, Wales; and also two exam-
ples of retrofit: the installation of PVs on schools in New Jersey, USA
and energy efficiency improvements in the public government build-
ings in Berlin, Germany.
The data collection methodologies involved document analysis,
in-depth, semi-structured interviews with key actors conducted
face-to-face, by telephone and by Skype, site visits where possible
and, in the case of the overseas projects, comparative workshops to
identify the distinctive features compared to UK practice. The
Stockholm case also benefitted from a series of supplementary
interviews with local real estate professionals and the Newport
case from additional document analysis of online local planning
department records. The interview transcripts were coded accord-
ing to a pre-agreed common coding scheme derived from a co-evo-
lutionary perspective (see GOS, 2008) that encompassed
technological, economic, social and governance dimensions. This
enabled a wide range of aspects of the project to be recorded for
later analysis and allowed the particular questions about exchange
flows and modalities of valuation arising from the economization
programme to be addressed. Quotes from transcripts could be
readily retrieved to understand the discursive constructions and2 See www.ucl.ac.uk/CLUES.the information derived enabled the socio-technical assemblages
to be mapped.
For each project we have provided a simplified sketch of rela-
tionships between social actors to help the reader, supplemented
with a more detailed table setting out the key exchange flows
and associated artefacts/market devices and modalities of valua-
tion that were involved.Newport wind turbines, wales
The first project considered is a private-sector sponsored
meso-wind turbine installation in Newport, Wales, worth around
£6 million. Here, on the site of a chemical company, Solutia, two
grid-connected 2.5 MW wind turbines were installed in 2009 by
developers Wind Direct, part of the Wind Prospect Group. The
developer leased the turbine site from Solutia and they now own,
operate and maintain the turbines. The turbines are connected to
Solutia’s own internal grid, which has a connection to the district
network operator’s (DNO) grid. Most of the electricity produced
is consumed on-site by Solutia, with any excess then sold on to
the grid.
Although a local project and an example of decentralised energy
generation, this was not framed in localist terms and the local com-
munity were relatively passive. Local residents were consulted
through a pre-existing community liaison panel but as the devel-
opment is at least 500 m from the nearest residential area and
there is existing industrial development in the locality, there were
no substantial objections. Furthermore, as the electricity is mainly
used on-site and then exported to the grid rather than to specific
local consumers (say through a local grid or private wire arrange-
ment), local electricity users have little reason to treat any energy
generated by this turbine differently from that coming from any
other source; this is not ‘local’ energy from the community’s point
of view.
The funding was provided by pension fund investment with a
specific specialist renewables fund in anticipation of income from
two sources. First, there is the income from the supply of electricity
both to Solutia and, for any surplus, to the grid. Solutia are paying
less than they would have otherwise and this acted as a major
incentive to host the turbines in the first place. Nevertheless elec-
tricity generation also provides an income stream to the turbine
developer. The key artefacts here are the Power Purchase Agree-
ment with Solutia and the contracts with energy companies under-
pinned by the connections agreement with the district network
operator. These establish the parallel but contrary flows of money
and electricity. Second, income also arose from the Renewable
Obligation. This obligation requires energy companies to supply a
certain proportion of their energy from renewable sources. Renew-
able energy generators are awarded Renewable Obligation Certifi-
cates or ROCs to certify their supply and such ROCs can be traded in
the ROCs market or contracted to a company in need of ROCs to
meet their renewable obligation. ROCs are thus an asset that can
be sold for income.
Fig. 1 thus shows the multiple exchanges that occur within this
project, money for money but also money for property rights, for
electricity flows and for the artefact of ROCs. Devising the sets of
socio-technical relationships that enabled these flows required
creativity: ‘‘It was kind of an innovative construction, the funding’’
(InterviewWP4:NP:1). And essential to this creativity was creating
a mutual commercial interest, partly in terms of direct financial
benefit but also due to improved reputation and competitive
advantage:
‘‘Interviewer: So do the financial benefits go to you then or do
they go back to the third party?
The contract is arranged that they are shared.
Exchange To/from Artefact or Market 
Device
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Fig. 1. Newport wind turbine.
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Yes.
Interviewer: So that is quite a good deal then, isn’t it?
Absolutely, yes.’’ (Interview WP4:NP:2)
These aims could only be achieved by activating certain market
devices or artefacts, notably the contracts and associated bills for
electricity supply and the ROCs as tradable permits. The former
allowed the material flows of electrical power to be transformed
into financial flows over time and the latter created a paper asset
that generated a capital value in the ROC market place based on
certified electricity generation. These artefacts are essential in
assembling the network of actors and technology into a viable
and effective set of relationships and they tied the social actors –
the developer, the grid, the consumers – into relationships of
energy supply and payment for that supply.
While there are links through to market valuation processes
that established a price to the project for renewably generated
electricity and for ROCs, the financial value of many other flows
was negotiated rather than ‘taken’ from market evidence. This
included the return on the capital investment, the rent for the site
and the price of power supplied to Solutia, all of which were nego-
tiated. The way that the negotiations created fixed and certain val-
uations further underpinned the framing of the project as a long
term investment with high certainty of returns and low risk.
‘‘when a client signs up they have a clear expectation of what
the prices of the electricity will be sort of from day one really,
and that doesn’t really change. So they know, when they’re
signing up, that the potential three or four years later is to have
a wind turbine on their site at X pence per kilowatt.’’ (Interview
WP4:NP:3)
This in turn supported the long term involvement of funding
actors which enabled the investment and inception of the project
in the first place. The whole project was viewed from a 25 yeartimescale, so that the financial ties within the network had to be
stable and capable of longevity: ‘‘it’s a long term investment for
us; it’s a 25 year investment.’’ (Interview WP4:NP:3)
This case study shows the role of key artefacts such as energy
contracts and ROCs in rendering visible the material flows of elec-
tricity and enabling their transformation into financial resources,
both of which were essential for the cementing of the social actors
and the technology into a viable and effective project. The
exchanges supported by these artefacts were negotiated rather
than ‘taken’ from the market and these negotiations further cre-
ated some certainty for the monetary flows, thereby reducing risk
and encouraging investment. They also enabled actors to see them-
selves in a mutually beneficial commercial relationship to each
other and to the technology of the project.Kungsbrohuset, Stockholm, Sweden
Kungsbrohuset is a major redevelopment project just opposite
the central railway station in Stockholm, Sweden completed in
2010. It comprises 27,000 m2 of commercial space in a 13 storey
building, including shops, restaurant, cafes as well as a hotel and
offices. The building is promoted as a ‘green’ development with
the emphasis on high standards of energy efficiency. It carries
three different brands of green certification: Green Building,
P-Mark and Eco-Class.
There are a variety of green technologies deployed such as a
highly energy efficient facade, triple glazing to a high standard of
thermal efficiency and heating using thermal gains from the neigh-
bouring railway station. Technology that interfaces more directly
with occupiers includes the provision of a ‘green’ shut-off button
that puts all systems into low-energy mode and the support of
all tenants by a dedicated expert who helps them to minimise their
environmental impact through their engagement with the build-
ing’s technologies and behavioural change. Weather forecasting
is also used to help regulate energy settings for internal comfort.
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green technology within this development to market the building
in a distinctive way, as ‘‘eco-smart’’. It must be recognised that
building standards in Sweden generally and Stockholm specifically
are already stringent. All new building projects are carried out to a
very high standard of environmental efficiency, but this develop-
ment clearly wanted to project itself as something beyond the
usual standard of green building. The aim was to let the space to
companies that wished to boost their own image as environmen-
tally-friendly.
As Fig. 2 summarises, the flows within this project were rela-
tively straight-forward with rental agreements and energy con-
tacts establishing financial and socio-technological relationships
between the three key social actors over building use and electric-
ity consumption. But the flows were shaped by the socio-material-
ity of the building and the institutional arrangements captured in
the ‘green lease’, which established contractual relations between
the landlord/developer and tenants. The building design and ongo-
ing management led to reduced electricity consumption due to a
mix of infrastructure for heating scavenging, energy efficiency
measures and changed occupier practices. At the same time, the
green lease tied the landlord and tenant into working together to
reduce energy consumption. This also needs to be seen in the con-
text of an ongoing shift occurring within the Swedish commercial
rental market from a situation where the landlord paid all energy
bills and recovered them through the rent (which was fixed for a
term of 3–5 years and then renegotiated) to one where tenants
are picking up these costs directly. This shift, while not necessarily
changing the actual level of payments, is changing the visibility of
energy costs to occupiers.
The valuation of the flows in this case was strongly related to
how prices were being set in the broader Swedish energy and com-
mercial property markets. Taking the energy price-setting first, in
Sweden, the market price of electricity varies considerably from
the hours of peak demand (when the country has to import elec-
tricity) to low demand hours (when there is a considerable sur-
plus). In Kungsbrohuset, the owner sells electricity to their
tenants at a price that is fixed for three to four years. This providesExchange To/from A
M
Property Rights 
for Rent
Developer/Owner & 
Building Tenants
G
Electricity and 
heat for Per Unit 
Price
Developer/Owner & 
Building Tenants
L
B
Electricity for Per 
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Developer/Owner & 
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E
S
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Energy 
Companies
Build
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Fig. 2. Kungbthe tenant with certainty and buffers them from price variations
due to the time of consumption or, in addition, medium-term mar-
ket variations. This certainty for tenants also enables them to fore-
see the financial benefits of energy saving measures that they as
occupiers undertake.
The rental valuation depends on how the actors in the commer-
cial property market are reacting to the emergence of branded
‘green’ buildings and whether any price or rent differential to ‘nor-
mal’ buildings can be justified. There is ongoing debate within the
Stockholm property sector about the financial benefits of such
green marketing in terms of higher rental levels and capital values.
However interviews with local commercial estate agents reveal a
general agreement that green buildings tend to let more readily
and avoid vacancies because tenants will – all other things being
equal (including the rent) – favour a more environmentally-
efficient building. This is particularly the case if there are reputa-
tional benefits to be gained from the occupancy of such a building.
‘‘Interviewer: Are you getting profit from it now?
Yes. We wouldn’t do it otherwise. We earn money on the ten-
ants because they pay us money to rent the letting. We don’t
earn money on the energy efficiency. That’s just a bonus kind
of. We earn more money because it’s energy efficient, but we
don’t earn money only because it’s energy efficient.’’ (Interview
WP5:KBH:1)
Indeed the developer rejected financial subsidies in the case of
this project because he wanted to demonstrate the market value of
green development practices:
‘‘Interviewer: Do you get any subsidies for geothermal let’s say
or for water cooling systems?
We could probably have them, but we don’t want them because
we want to build this project on solely an economic base.’’
(Interview WP5:KBH:1)
In this case the exchanges were strongly connected to broader
market exchanges for energy and commercial property but the nat-
ure of that connection was shaped by the socio-technology of the
building (the infrastructure, built fabric and associated practices)rtefact or 
arket Device
Modality of valuaon of 
flow
reen Lease Market rent for ‘green 
building’
ease; Energy 
ill
Stabilised price for 
electricity; Value of heat 
included in rent
lectricity 
upply 
ontract
Market price for electricity
ing 
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loper/ 
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rohuset.
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of the green lease and changing institutional relationships between
landlords and tenants over energy costs that made such costs more
visible to tenants, and the decision of the developer as building
owner to provide medium-term certainty to tenants on energy
costs. These all rendered the development project an intervention
in the socio-material construction of a ‘green building’ market in
which environmental features commanded value premiums and
reduced risk yields.Berlin Energy Saving Partnership, Germany
The Berlin Energy Saving Partnership is an example of energy
performance contracting (EPC). This form of contracting represents
a move onwards from an energy services supply model (in which
energy services are sold), itself a shift on from the model of just
selling quantities of energy. Energy performance contracting is
about supplying a service which delivers, through a variety of tech-
nological investments and coordination measures, a saving in
energy consumption.
In the Berlin case, the core actor is the Berlin Energy Agency
(BEA) and its range of subsidiary Energy Services Companies or
ESCOs. BEA was established in 1992 as a public-private partnership
of the Federal State of Berlin, Vattenfall Europe (an energy supply
company with a considerable renewables portfolio), GASAG and
KfW Banking Group. The specific purpose of the Berlin Energy Sav-
ing Partnership (BESP) is to raise finance for retrofit of commercial
properties within the public estate in Berlin: that is, schools and
nurseries, universities, the opera house, swimming pools and
offices.
BEA, through an ESCO, raises money from banks as a loan on the
collateral of repayments from the energy savings. The customer,
here the public estate in Berlin, pays the ESCO for energy saving
and optimisation services delivering guaranteed energy savings.
These energy savings pay back the bank loan and are also intended
to generate a further net saving for the ESCO and the public sector.
The financial risks are borne by the ESCO if savings fall below the
guaranteed level set within the contract.Exchange To/from A
M
Capital Investment 
for Return 
Financial Instuon  
BEA/subsidiary ESCOs
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V
Energy Saving 
Measures for Fees 
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Public Estate Owners 
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Fig. 3. Berlin energy sa‘‘Interviewer: How does that financial picture work?
This is regulated in a contract and, as I told you, for political rea-
sons I think we have more or less all the contract share of saving
goes to the customer which is so-called shared savings, more
you could say. And usually we have something that 80% goes
to the ESCO and 20% to the customer, but sometimes we have
90% and 10%. This also depends on when the customer said
‘Okay’. . . . But this is given with the tender documents, so it is
pre-defined you could say.
Interviewer: So does the ESCO make a profit on that?
Yes.’’ (Interview WP5:BESP:1)
The investments needed to deliver energy improvements are
refinanced through the ‘guaranteed’ cost savings over the lifetime
of the contract, usually 12–15 years: ‘‘we have the concept that
the total repayment of the investment has to be done with the sav-
ings’’ (InterviewWP5:BESP:1). At the end of the contract, the aim is
that the public sector has buildings that will continue to provide
energy savings: ‘‘The contract is then terminated and there’s a final
audit of the project and then the energy savings come back to the
building owner and all the savings remain with the building
owner.’’ (Interview WP5:BESP:1)
As Fig. 3 summarises, the central artefact in this set of institu-
tional arrangements coordinating the actions of the four key actors
is the Energy Performance Contact (EPC) and the main modality of
valuation is negotiation of the financial shares of energy savings
resulting from investments by BEA and their associated ESCOs. In
Germany there is an established legal framework for EPC and
appropriate standards, including standards for contracting models.
EPC is defined as: ‘‘a comprehensive energy service (planning,
implementation, operation and optimisation of building installa-
tions) that aims to achieve guaranteed improvements’’ (VDMA
Standard 24198); the artefact of the contract, by which payments
from energy savings are recouped and distributed, is central to
making EPC work.
Within this, the issue of the cost of maintenance and, more
importantly, who pays for these costs is a central issue. Part of
the returns have to cover maintenance and operational costs, the
exact share being determined in the EPC contract: ‘‘The main sharertefact or 
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Y. Rydin et al. / Geoforum 59 (2015) 1–11 7of the contract is about the investment and 80% of the future pay-
ments go just to repayment of the installations of the investment
and the other 20% is services as in operational maintenance and
control.’’ (Interview WP5:BESP:1)
Originally BEA had a contract whereby they were responsible
for all maintenance, servicing etc.:
‘‘BEA has this full service contract that the ESCO also has to do
the maintenance of all devices, all technical installations as in
heating, cooling and ventilation and this, of course, is costly.
Maintenance is costly and that’s why today usually the con-
tracts have just a share of the maintenance has to be done as
responsibility of the ESCO.’’ (Interview WP5:BESP:1)
This was only possible in the BESP case because of the scale of
savings that would result from improving a very low, energy-inef-
ficient base:
‘‘For example, if the cost of operation, maintenance and service
is 100,000 p.a. for one building pool and there is a saving of 1
million Euros per year, then of course there’s potential to do a
full service contract. But if there’s just 300,000 savings, then
more or less the main share of this goes to the bank for the pay-
ment of the credit and maybe there’s then just 50,000 left to do
operation, maintenance and service and then of course there
has to be a margin then.’’ (Interview WP5:BESP:1)
Here BEA was estimating the energy savings at, on average, 26%.
The main ways these savings were achieved were through fairly
simple socio-technical measures that gave a good, immediate
return. Under the first phase of the programme, the energy effi-
ciency measures that have been implemented include refurbish-
ment of heating and lighting technology and better energy
management including changed occupier behaviour. Replacement
of windows and insulation was not part of the first phase but is
in a planned programme of works. This, however, requires a differ-
ent financial model;
‘‘The main reason is the payback time. Because with a 10 year
contract, you know there has to be a share for the customer.
So it’s not the total savings going to the financing of the mea-
sures and that’s why you cannot. . . well, window replacement
but also insulation and so on, they have paybacks of 15, 20,
25 years and it’s not feasible with the financing concept of the
classical energy saving partnerships.’’ (Interview WP5:BESP:1)
Window replacement, for example, only becomes a possibility if
there is shared financing from the client, here the Berlin public
estate, as well as via the ESCO.
One other key feature of the BESP project is that it is framed as a
portfolio approach. Buildings are ‘pooled’ so that average energy
savings across the portfolio reach the necessary level to make the
contract work. Some of the public estate offered very considerable
savings indeed, particularly the larger buildings, while others –
such as, say, nurseries – offered much lower savings rates. So:
‘‘We are doing this pooling of buildings. Of course, there’s a
cross-financing between the buildings’’ and ‘‘high consuming and
large saving potential buildings are somehow co-financing the
smaller and not so attractive’’ (Interview WP5:BESP:1).
BEA plays a vital role in making EPC work. It is an essential
intermediary, the corporate embodiment of the contract. Across
Berlin, BEA has been involved in 25 contracts operated by 16 differ-
ent ESCOs and involving some 100 subcontractors in implementa-
tion work. While the ESCOs bear any risk of failure to deliver
energy savings, BEA takes its return from its fees: ‘‘Well we don’t
have risks of the saving guarantees because our consultancy ser-
vice is more or less a fixed amount.’’ (Interview WP5:BESP:1)The ESCOs carry the risk but this is low given the potential for
energy savings in the Berlin public estate. Savings of up to 35%
are stipulated in the EPC contracts and have been consistently
achieved. The ESCOs generally work on a margin of at least 10%
to cover any risk. In addition, ESCOs have adopted a forfeiting
model to optimise their balance sheets through the way that the
EPC contracts are structured:
‘‘usually total 100% financing comes from the ESCO usually as a
credit, but in the latest – I think starting in the past 10 years –
we have more or less [the] forfeiting model. . . . It’s a section of
the contract. So the future receivables are sold to a bank. . . . This
is about the balance sheet of the ESCOs because when you’re
doing credit financing they have the credit on their balance
sheet and that’s why this forfeiting is a kind of model to have
the assets on the client’s balance sheet.’’ (Interview
WP5:BESP:1)
Here the role of the key artefact – the EPC contract between the
owners of the public estate and BEA or its subsidiary ESCO – is
clear. This is a case where an artefact is the energy project; it would
have no existence without this contract as its genesis. It plays the
key role in coordinating actors and in supporting the negotiation of
the value of the exchange flows within the project. The framing of
the project as pooling energy savings through a portfolio approach,
the design of the project in terms of identifying the ‘low hanging
fruit’ of energy saving technology and the identity of BEA as a
key intermediary all stem from the nature of this contract.
Morris model, New Jersey, USA
The final case study concerns the implementation of a financial
model devised by Stephen Pearlman, a New Jersey lawyer, to
enable the financing of renewable technology in local schools.
The essence of this model is the arrangement of ownership of
assets so that full advantage can be taken of tax breaks.
Usually local governments in USA have two ways of financing
solar programmes: either with tax exempt bonds or by entering
into turnkey relationships with private solar developers. In the for-
mer case, local government issues debt that typically has to be
repaid over the life of the project. The local authority owns the
solar system as well as retaining all the benefits of this ownership
other than the federal tax benefits (which it is not entitled to under
this arrangement). However the debt adds to the financial burden
of local government and requires a procurement process to design,
acquire and install the solar project. A turnkey developer-owned
solar scheme is typically used when local government lacks knowl-
edge or experience of solar project development. In such schemes
the private developer designs, finances, installs, operates and
maintains the solar system and then sells the renewable energy
back to the local authority through a Power Purchase Agreement
(PPA) (Pearlman and Scerbo, 2010).
The Morris Model is a hybrid that incorporates elements of both
these approaches, maximising benefits and minimizing drawbacks
(Chegwidden et al., 2010). The idea of the hybrid approach is that
the county provides the financing through a bond issue. A county-
based agency issues bonds supported by the credit of the county;
this significantly lowers the costs of capital for the project. The pro-
ject then uses a turnkey approach with the difference that the
financing is being provided at low cost by the local authority. This
allows for cheaper financing as well as preserving the developers’
capacity to borrow from private lending sources for other projects
and take advantage of tax breaks (Pearlman and Scerbo, 2010). The
occupiers of the sites where the solar panels were installed did not
have to bear any out-of-pocket costs.
8 Y. Rydin et al. / Geoforum 59 (2015) 1–11‘‘The way we structure these deals we make the developer pay
the debt service by entering into a lease purchase agreement
with the improvement authority. So the improvement authority
floats the debt, the county guarantees it, the improvement
authority takes the money and gives it to the developer and
the developer buys the panels but, when those panels come
in, they’re owned by the improvement authority. The improve-
ment authority leases them to the developer and over the
15 year the developer makes lease payments. Those lease pay-
ments equal the debt service on the improvement authority
bonds. So the county guarantee will only get called on if the
developer does not live up what they said they would do. And
the reason the developer will offer that lower PPA price is
because they’re getting all those benefits I mentioned earlier –
federal tax benefits, the state SREC benefits – and so they feel
that this is something they can handle.’’ (InterviewWP5:MM:3)
Fig. 4 shows that the exchange flows are more complex that in
the other three cases with multiple artefacts involved. The valua-
tion of the flows is highly dependent on negotiation with reference
back to market price-setting in investment and energy markets but
with discounting to share out the financial benefits of the coordi-
nated arrangement. There are three key elements that create these
financial benefits for sharing: the tax breaks (including SREC ben-
efits – see below), the reduction in risk and borrowing costs, and
the reduced energy costs to the school bill which is paid by the
county.Exchange To/from A
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Fig. 4. MorriTaking the tax breaks first, these operate at both Federal and
state-level and are only available to private sector organisations:
‘‘in the public sector here in New Jersey, if we installed our own
system the public sector had no benefit of any of the federal tax
benefits’’ (Interview WP5:MM:2). In addition, in New Jersey they
operate an SREC system: ‘‘Those are the tax credits based upon
installing energy efficiency systems where a company coming in,
installing a solar system let’s say has a tax benefit. They place a
value on these credits which immediately began depreciating the
cost of the project’’ (Interview WP5:MM:2).
Furthermore: ‘‘Washington’s tax code, . . . gives a 30% invest-
ment tax credit for PV along with a 5 year accelerated, what they
call MACRS depreciation. Those benefits exist anywhere in the
country. In addition, in the stimulus legislation in Febuary 2009,
when our economy was somewhat stalled and Congress passed
an $800 billion plus stimulus bill, expiring this year is a provision
called the 1603 Grant Programme that allows PV developers to
take a 30% . . . instead of taking a tax credit, they actually get a che-
que from our United States Treasury for 30%. . . . So 30% is not 30%
when you’re done. It could be 25% or 24%. Whereas cash, a cheque
from the United States Treasury, is fully 30%’’ (Interview
WP5:MM:3)
Turning to the reduced cost of credit, a key factor is the reduc-
tion in risk that this model creates. This is because ‘‘the bonds
would be based on the credit of the towns’’ (InterviewWP5:MM:3)
and this credit was good: ‘‘We have a Triple A bond rating with
Standard and Poor’s and, you know, Moody’s. So we’re, you know,rtefact or Market 
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in and we presented this project to them I think that they realised
that yes, we were backing it’’ Interview WP5:MM:4). As another
interview said:
‘‘it put the county guarantee on the bonds that were issued by
the County Improvement Authority and, with that country
guarantee, was able to get much lower cost of capital than the
private solar developer could get on their own. And in return
the county improvement authority said to the developer: We’ll
give you this in effect cheaper money. We’ll be your bank. We’ll
provide you with this cheaper source of capital that you don’t
have access to and in return we want you to give us a much
lower PPA.’’ (Interview WP5:MM:3)
And the structure of the model makes it very unlikely that the
county’s guarantee will be called upon because the debt was
reduced ‘‘to just an amount that can be covered from PPA and some
minimum SREC value; that’s given them a lot of comfort that their
guarantee, if it was ever called upon, would be repaid, if not fully,
close to fully.’’ (Interview WP5:MM:3)
The artefact of the Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) sets out
the price to be paid for electricity by the consumer, here the
schools:
‘‘So the company that came in to install the solar panels was
also the company that was going to be providing [electricity]
to the country. Under the auspices of the Improvement Author-
ity, a [PPA] ... was established at year-one-beginning kilowatt
rate, increasing 3% each year over the 15 year life of the pro-
gramme and that was the most important component of the
analysis of whether this project was fruitful. ‘‘(Interview
WP5:MM:2)
In Morris County, the operation of this quite complex model
worked out as follows. The local government leased roof space
(including car ports in car parks) on schools and sports arenas to
an agency, the Morris County Improvement Authority. The MCIA
raised funding from investors by issuing low-interest bonds which
were backed by Morris County. This finance was used to install
solar panels on the roof spaces through the involvement of solar
power developer, Tioga Energy with the design and installation
services of SunDurance Energy. The solar panels were then leased
to Tioga, transferring ownership and providing a revenue stream
to the MCIA to service the bonds. The solar developer, Tioga
Energy, then entered into 15 year contract (the PPAs) with Morris
County to supply electricity to their schools. The whole scheme
was underwritten by a letter of credit from the solar power devel-
oper to ensure that if the county guarantee on the bonds was ever
called upon, the local authority was repaid in full.
The first installation began in June 2010 at the William G. Men-
nen Sports Arena amounting to 6838 solar modules and producing
a saving of about $50,200 p.a. Thereafter a variety of school boards
and districts have used the model to finance solar panel installa-
tions at a number of schools with considerable savings per annum
per school:
‘‘It appears that we’re right on track for savings actually a little
higher than what we anticipated; an annual saving somewhere
around $18,000 a year where we had projected potentially
$15,000.’’ (Interview WP5:MM:1)
‘‘In the end they were able to get that rate down to 10 cents. So
it was a penny less than what we were paying at the time and so
then it became beneficial for us to be part of the project. ...and
my budget for this one site, the benefit of having solar provided
reduces our electric bill by about $42,000 a year for this firstyear. This’ll be our first year and there’s a report schedule that
shows over 15 years we’ll actually gain a better benefit.’’ (Inter-
view WP5:MM:2)
The key to this scheme is the way that the artefacts structure
the exchange flows of finance (capital and revenue/cost), property
rights (to sites and solar panels) and renewable electricity. There
are five artefacts involved: the licence for the roof space; the issue
of bonds; the lease of the solar panels; the electricity contract or
PPA; and the returns in which the tax credit is claimed. These
arrangements, and their inter-connection, ensure that net financial
benefits are maximised providing a value surplus for negotiation.
In particular the taxable ownership of these solar panels is trans-
ferred to the solar power developer through leases, ensuring taxa-
tion benefits are maximised. Due to these benefits, the electricity is
sold to the schools via Morris County at low cost, estimated on
average at about 35% below the prices of the local energy utility
and risk is reduced.
The institutional arrangements and socio-material assemblage
provides effective coordination so that the different actors can
exercise their capacities. The schools offer their under-utilised real
estate space on building and carport roofs while suffering no dis-
ruption. The project design itself emphasises the unobtrusive ret-
rofit of the PVs so as not to interfere with the operation of the
schools. Some schools have even built new roofs or car-ports to
accommodate the PVs. The county brings its Triple A rating to
guarantee the bonds and benefits from a reduced utilities bill: ‘‘it
will reduce the utility bill we pay for no infrastructure cost and
no maintenance cost’’ (Interview WP5:MM:2). The solar developer
brings their technological and market expertise in return for com-
mercial profit. And the broker, the MCIA ‘‘take an administrative
fee to cover their costs’’ (Interview WP5:MM:3).
The whole Morris Model project is essentially constructed as a
hybrid aggregation of existing financial models that creates mutual
value benefits through a mesh of exchange flows, with the addi-
tional value then split in negotiated portions between the actors.
This hybridity is encapsulated in the five artefacts that together
make up the model and coordinate the actors, their engagement
with the socio-technology of solar electricity generation and their
negotiation over the share of value created.Conclusions – rendering local energy projects economic
In this paper we have attempted a ‘reframing’ of the concept of
financial barriers and incentives to the pursuit of local energy pro-
jects. Returning to the work of Michel Callon and colleagues in the
new economization programme, we have resisted viewing the
‘economic’ as fixed and easily located in distinction to the socio-
technical aspects of each project. Similarly we have avoided the
temptation to assume the contents of the ‘economic’ dimension
as ready-made and easily transported into or out of each project.
Rather we have tried to unpick and unpack the multiple dimen-
sions of the different socio-material actants involved in each pro-
ject and the diverse roles they play in helping to assemble,
cohere and sustain each energy project. We have paid particular
attention to the exchange flows – of money for money, and of
money for material goods and services – and considered how arte-
facts or market devices form institutional arrangements to coordi-
nate these different elements in a project. We have looked at the
modalities of valuation of these flows and the way that the mate-
rial is implicated in generating financial value, as well as the
importance of inter-actor negotiation in the share of this value
with reference to, but not determined by price setting in the
broader market-place.
From this analysis there are a number of points that we wish to
bring out. First, these cases confirm Callon and Caliskan’s emphasis
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of coordination. While the BESP model was more well-established,
we could identify the human creativity involved in imagining the
Morris Model, Kungsbrohuset and the Newport wind development.
These innovative local energy projects would not have occurred
without such inventiveness.
Our next conclusion is the importance of identifying all the
multiple flows associated with exchanges within a local energy
project and not just focusing on the end point-of-sale of electricity
or energy. It is the overall pattern of flows that represents the coor-
dination of exchanges and that binds together the ensemble of
social and material actants into a project assemblage. And it is
the collective of all the relationships within the assemblage that
is generative, that produces the prototype of a new form of local
energy system. We have also seen how a mixture of modalities
of valuation are involved in calculating the worth of these
exchange flows, including reliance on prices set in a broader mar-
ket but also discounting from these market prices and negotiating
shares of value generated. Furthermore multiple modalities will be
involved in any one project so that valuation can be seen to be a
process of layering and inter-leaving different modalities into a
(semi)stable arrangement.
We have particularly noted the importance of artefacts, of mar-
ket devices such as energy supply contracts, Power Purchase
Agreements, property leases, investment vehicles, Renewable Obli-
gation Certificates and even tax returns. It is these artefacts that
‘hold’ the exchange relations in some degree of stability and struc-
ture the modalities of valuation. How a contract or agreement is
drawn up makes a difference to the way an exchange is valued
and how it can be shared between parties. But this is not a purely
social process – the materiality of the socio-technical infrastruc-
ture and built form is always implicated in the way that an artefact
is able to generate values through institutional coordination of
actors. A more energy efficient and heat scavenging building
reduces energy costs and this shapes the exchange flows between
energy supplier, building owner and tenants in conjunction with
the terms of the key market device, the green lease.
While we consider that Callon et al.’s concept of market device
has proved very fruitful in identifying the role of specific artefacts
in coordinating socio-material entities – actors and technology –
within innovative local energy projects, we identified two features
of such coordination that have not been emphasised sufficiently to
date. First, each of these cases involved negotiation between social
actors over the financial surplus generated by the associations
between these social actors and also the technologies of energy
systems and the built environment. While market pricing set the
backdrop for these negotiations, valuations were not ‘drawn down’
but rather recalibrated through engagements between actants.
This suggests that, at least in such innovative projects, valuation
is not the codified results of ‘disentangled’ exchanges in the market
place but rather remain contested and the result of agency in spe-
cific institutional and local contexts. Miller (2002) has also argued
against the view of market transactions as ‘disentangled’ from the
specifics of certain cases of exchange; he goes further in suggesting
that such exchanges entangle multiple aspects of actors’ personal
lives, set within the context of cultural and moral norms. We
would not go so far; the negotiations we found in these cases of
innovative local energy projects were set against the backdrop of
disentangled market pricing (for energy, for ROCs, for property)
but they involved an additional dynamic, the negotiation between
parties of how the financial shares should be split up in this case.
Second, we would draw attention to the importance of finding
means to reduce risk in such projects. In all our cases, institutional
arrangements were put in place to create some degree of certainly
with regard to exchange flows – for electricity, for rent, for returns
on investment. This is important because the timescales of boththe technologies and actors’ horizons in these projects is often
longer than the expected stability within market pricing. Only by
creating some certainty can the project attract the necessary
investment (financial but also in terms of time, commitment, trust)
to enable the project to proceed.
These kinds of detail only become apparent when specific cases
are studied. In a review of the usefulness of the new economic soci-
ology McFall argues that the’’thick description of the situated,
distributed and material character’’ of markets enables an under-
standing of ‘‘how the different priorities and purposes of different
market devices format the dispositions and skills of the people who
encounter them (2009, p. 279). This emphasis on the ‘encounter’
between material elements, technologies, institutions, places and
people, ‘formated’ by key artefacts is key to understanding the pro-
cesses and practices of assembly and the success and failure of
local energy projects. Muniesa et al. (2007, p. 1) also acknowledge
the value of such cases which are ‘‘attentive to the empirical intri-
cacies of agency [and] . . . pay particular attention to the trials in
which actors test the resistance that defines the reality of the
world surrounding them’’.
We would argue that the processes of negotiation over financial
value and creating some certainty in exchange flows are essential
for stabilizing ‘‘the forms and meanings of what is to be considered
economic in a particular site and at a particular time’’ (ibid, p. 3).
Furthermore, this is a necessary pre-requisite for an innovative
project in one site to evolve into a market-place of many such
projects. By focussing just on the level of the ‘market’ and how
established calculations occur within that market, Callon and his
co-researchers miss the importance of the innovative project in
creating new market possibilities and the work that goes into the
first calculations within that project. More recently, in response
to that criticism that his work is a-political, Callon has looked at
the development of new products and suggested that their design,
qualification and commodification ‘‘imply cooperation between
multifarious agents and institutions’’ and that this ‘‘implies com-
plex, changing and evolving partnerships necessitating specific
modalities of intellectual property and contractual arrangements’’
(2010, p. 166). This is the point at which the market is ‘caught’
between exploration (or innovation) and exploitation (or estab-
lished market practices).
We consider that it is particularly relevant for future change in
energy systems whether these cases can move from innovation to
exploitation and become ‘conventional’. Energy performance con-
tracting has become so in Germany on the basis of government
efforts to standardise and institutionalise this form of market
device and associated contractual arrangements. The clear demon-
stration of exchange flows to the negotiated, mutual benefit of all
actors would also underpin the shift from one-off to conventional.
Where market-wide modes of valuation act as signals of such
mutual benefits, as with the emerging green buildings market in
Sweden, then that shift will be further embedded. But this requires,
as de Landa (2006) emphasises, repetition. The combination of
institutional arrangements – supported by key artefacts – and
socio-technical infrastructure – combining technology and new
practices – needs to be tried again and again in different projects,
different sites. The demonstrated ability of the institutional
arrangements to quantify the exchange flows with some certainty
is important here as a project with reduced risk is more likely to be
repeated. Only then may the assemblage of specific projects
become the agencement of new energy and urban property market
processes.
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